We consider an outsourcing problem where a group of manufacturers outsource jobs to a single third-party who owns a specialized facility needed to process these jobs. The third-party announces the time slots available on her facility and the associated prices. Manufacturers reserve, on a first-come-first-book basis, time slots that they desire to utilize. Booking of overtime is possible, at a higher cost. A job completed after its due date incurs a tardiness cost. Each manufacturer books chunks of facility time and sequences his jobs over the time slots booked, so as to minimize his booking, overtime, and tardiness costs. This model captures the main features of outsourcing operations in industries like semiconductor manufacturing, biotechnology, drug R&D, etc. In current practice, the third-party executes all outsourced jobs without performing optimization and coordination.
We consider an outsourcing problem where a group of manufacturers outsource jobs to a single third-party who owns a specialized facility needed to process these jobs. The third-party announces the time slots available on her facility and the associated prices. Manufacturers reserve, on a first-come-first-book basis, time slots that they desire to utilize. Booking of overtime is possible, at a higher cost. A job completed after its due date incurs a tardiness cost. Each manufacturer books chunks of facility time and sequences his jobs over the time slots booked, so as to minimize his booking, overtime, and tardiness costs. This model captures the main features of outsourcing operations in industries like semiconductor manufacturing, biotechnology, drug R&D, etc. In current practice, the third-party executes all outsourced jobs without performing optimization and coordination.
We investigate the issue of the third-party serving as a coordinator to create a win-win solution to all. We propose a model based on a cooperative game as follows: (i) Upon receiving the booking requests from the manufacturers, the third-party derives an optimal solution if manufacturers cooperate, and computes the savings achieved; (ii) She devises a savings sharing scheme so that, in monetary terms, every manufacturer is better off to coordinate than act independently or coalesce with a sub-group of manufacturers; (iii) For her work, the third-party withholds a portion ρ of the booking revenue paid by the manufacturers for time slots that are released after coordination. We further design a truth-telling mechanism, which can prevent any selfinterested manufacturer from purposely reporting false job data so as to take advantage of the coordination scheme. We also show that the mechanism still ensures the (modified) savings sharing distribution to be in the core of the cooperative game. Finally, we perform a large set of simulation to assess the value of coordination to the various parties involved.
Subject classifications : Outsourcing; Scheduling and planning; Cooperative game; Truth-telling Mechanism.
Introduction and Literature Review
Outsourcing has become an important business strategy of many firms today. Unlike large manufacturers of the past century, the most powerful firms of the 21st century are vertically disintegrated -they focus on their internal core competencies and outsource other operations to third parties with specialized facilities. Typical examples include high-tech manufacturing giants like Apple, Dell, Lucent, Cisco, Motorola and others, who outsource or subcontract major parts of their production. The ability of outsorucing is even more critical for small and mid-size enterprises (SME). As emphasized by Holton and Dastmalchi (2008) , for SME, "the ability to outsource ... is not just a matter of convenience ...; it is a pre-requisite for survival. Without the ability to farm out their manufacturing..., they simply lack the economies of scale that allow them to effectively compete with their larger competitors."
The main purpose of this article is to develop a model to coordinate the operations outsourced by multiple manufacturers to a single third-party 1 (3P). This type of 3P/manufacturer relationship is referred to as sole sourcing in the literature (see Elmaghraby, 2000) . The problem we address can be stated as follows. The 3P announces, at time 0, the available time slots of her facility and the associated price of each. The price of a time slot is determined by 3P according to seasonality of demand for her capacity. Overtime can also be requested, subject to a maximum amount and at a higher price. Time slots that are not available to manufacturers are reserved for 3P's internal production or for prior commitments.
Manufacturers are free to book the available time slots on a first-come-first-book (FCFB) basis.
Upon entering the system, a manufacturer selects amongst the time slots that are still available, so as to process his jobs at minimum cost. Except for the booking payment, a manufacturer suffers late penalties for his jobs completed after their due-dates, as well as the cost for overtime if such is requested. Evidently, early time slots are always preferred with respect to reducing tardiness penalties. However, early time slots may command a higher booking price and hence the manufacturer may be better off to select a later one of lower booking cost. Alternatively, a manufacturer may opt to buy overtime so as to avoid booking additional time or to reduce his tardiness penalties.
After the booking process is completed, 3P knows the reservation by each manufacturer and the schedule of his jobs. The sequential arrivals of manufacturers to the system imply that there is no coordination amongst manufacturers and that significant savings may be possible if she coordinates production. This leads to the problem we aim to investigate. Currently the industry practice is that 3P executes the jobs submitted by the manufacturers according to their reservations, without optimization or coordination. Can 3P help reduce costs, re-distribute the resulting savings, and increase the utilization of her capacity? How to prevent self-interested players from taking advantage of the savings sharing scheme, by reporting misleading information ? These and other related questions are what we aim to address in this article.
The operational protocol of the Semiconductor Product Analysis and Design Enhancement (SPADE) Center (www.ust.hk/spade) is a typical example that validates the applicability of our model. SPADE provides services to local and nearby semiconductor companies. A group of specialized facilities are available, which can be booked at a cost. Rules of the booking scheme are available in http : //www.ust.hk/spade/pricelist.html, and include the following: MyUMC (www.umc.com/english/about/j.asp), UMC's online supply chain portal, is another example that demonstrates how a large semiconductor company provides information sharing and real-time capacity booking to her customers. Founded in 1980 as Taiwan's first semiconductor company, UMC is now a world-leading semiconductor foundry, specializing in contract manufacturing of customer designed IC's. To foster close collaboration with her customers as well as partners throughout the entire supply chain, UMC has developed and maintained MyUMC since 1998. This is a full-service information portal, offering her customers 24-hour access to detailed account information such as manufacturing, engineering, design and financial data. In particular, MyUMC's capacity booking engine ATP (Available to Promise) allows customers to receive instant capacity availability information and to book production capacity in UMC's fabs online. Evidently, coordinated capacity and production planning opportunities exist within such a framework.
To summarize, SPADE's online reservation system, UMC's MyUMC, and specialized facilities with an online booking portal (additional examples include, e.g., Bosch Institute's hybrid PCR machine, aus.calsnet.net/ibr molbiol cal), fall naturally into the framework of our model. Our model is also applicable when reservations are made in other formats (e.g., telephone booking, or paper form). While the production and information protocols of many existing systems coincide with the assumptions of our model, there is no evidence that cooperative models and analytical methodologies like those prescribed in this article are utilized, primarily because the literature on production chain cooperation is scarce.
The model considered in this article significantly differs from the production scheduling literature in several aspects. First, existing literature carries the common hypothesis that one manufacturer possesses all capacity needed to process all his jobs. Second, our model considers the coordination of activities using incentive payments that render every manufacturer better off by abiding to the coordinated schedule. Third, the limited literature on cooperative sequencing games does not consider facility booking, whereas as we see from SPADE and MyUMC, booking decisions should be considered together with sequencing decisions.
The novelty of the proposed approach and the diverse applications provide the opportunity for research on a variety of operational protocols. Only a few papers closely related to ours have appeared recently. Aydinliyim and Vairaktarakis (2010) consider a similar operational protocol but focus on a different problem where the manufacturers are concerned about the weighted flowtime of their jobs. Moreover, overtime (which is one of the most difficult issues to tackle) is not allowed.
Because of the difference in the problem, their optimization algorithms and the cooperative game are very different from what we develop here. In particular, the truth-telling mechanism we devise represents a significant new effort to address the information misreporting issue in outsourcing cooperative games. Vairaktarakis and Aydinliyim (2007) consider a problem where a set of players subcontract work to a single 3P who aims to maximize the utilization of her facility. Each player, on the other hand, wants to complete his in-house and subcontracted workload as soon as possible -his main concern is thus how to properly align his in-house production plan with the outsourcing decision, so that his jobs can be finished as quick as possible. Evidently, this model bears no similarity with our model, does not incorporate booking or overtime costs, and the objective of each player is his makespan minimization. The authors propose a game which is found to be convex and propose coordinating schemes. Though a computational experiment, they compute the decentralization cost against the competitive version of the problem studied in Vairaktarakis (2008) .
Hall and Liu (2010) consider a different protocol that involves bidding, which concerns a maketo-order supply chain where the manufacturers have insufficient production capacity to process all such a problem, where each player wishes to optimize a weighted flowtime objective on a single machine. They show that the corresponding game is convex under some conditions, which implies that the core is guaranteed to be non-empty (see Gillies(1959) and Shapley (1971) for the concept of core). For arbitrary regular objective function and a class of σ 0 -Component Additive Games, Curiel et al. (1994) prove that the core is non-empty and propose one such core element. Hamers, Borm and Tijs (1995) consider the case with job release times, and show that these games are not convex except when all jobs have unit processing times or unit weights. Borm et al. (2002) consider the case with due dates. For three due-date based criteria they show that the core is non-empty and prove convexity for a special subclass. The above literature deals with cooperation as a means of achieving centralized benefits. Alternatively, one may choose competition as a vehicle for coordination. However, this type of literature is at its infancy. In Bukchin and Hanany (2007) , each player's objective is the sum of completion times of his jobs. They model competition on a single machine assuming infinite capacity and constant unit production cost for the remaining work. The authors measure the difference between the centralized cost and the overall cost resulted from competition, Also, they provide an incentive rule that causes players to mimic the centralized strategies. Agnetis et al. (2004) consider a scheduling problem between two agents, each competing to perform their respective jobs on a common processing resource. Leung, Pinedo, and Wan (2010) generalize this problem to the case with multiple machines. Relationships between two-agent scheduling problems and other areas such as rescheduling and scheduling subject to availability constraints are established. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We start the next section with a formal description of our model together with supporting assumptions. Algorithms are presented in Section 3 for computing the optimal booking and sequencing decisions. In Section 4 the savings sharing scheme is described. The truth-telling mechanism is presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we report our findings on the value of coordination. Concluding remarks are made in Section 7. The online appendices include our results on: (i) the total number of tardy jobs; (ii) the total weighted tardiness cost; (iii) an algorithm that computes the savings of any coalition; and (iv) a counterexample to show the non-convexity of the cooperative game.
Model and Assumptions
We consider the following problem: Let M be a group of manufacturers and 3P a single third-party.
Each m ∈ M outsources to 3P a set N m of operations (jobs) according to the following protocol: 
Each manufacturer schedules his own jobs over the windows that he has booked. The overall initial schedule σ 0 is the natural outcome of concatenating the schedules of all manufacturers. Then, at time t 0 , 3P reschedules all jobs so as to maximize the savings for players in M as a whole, thus forming the overall optimal schedule σ * . Without loss of generality we assume that all activities that take place during the booking interval [0, t 0 ] happen instantaneously at time 0 (i.e., assume t 0 = 0). Similarly, we assume that all jobs in N = ∪ m∈M N m are available at time 0. 7 Each job j ∈ N requires a processing time p j at 3P's facility. We assume that the total processing requirements of jobs in N m do not exceed the available capacity. Otherwise manufacturer m has to seek service elsewhere. We assume that the setup required between jobs is either negligible or included in the processing times. Moreover, we assume: 2. Every job may halt at the end of a manufacturing window and resume in a subsequent one.
3. The booking cost h t may only take on the value h or h P , where h is the booking cost on a regular demand day while h P is the cost on a peak demand day, with h P > h. 4 . Window W t : t = 1, 2, . . . , K hasŌ t =Ō of maximum available overtime.
5. One unit of overtime production during W t costs α t dollars, α t > h t /L and a t ∈ {α, α P }, where α and α P are the overtime rates for regular windows and peak windows, respectively.
6. For every job j ∈ N m , its due-date d j coincides with the end of a manufacturing window.
Introducing the assumptions makes our model more presentable without sacrificing applicability.
Assumption 1 reflects the reality that in practice, capacity bookings are made in multiples of a basic time unit (e.g., hour). Assumption 2 captures common practice where operations halted may resume between shifts. Assumption 3 allows 3P to segment her capacity so as to charge a premium during peak demand periods. Assumption 4 captures typical overtime limits utilized in industry.
Assumption 5 allows a higher unit overtime cost α P on a peak production window. Assumption 6 is in line with the practice where jobs are delivered in batches at the end of each shift.
The optimization problem faced by each manufacturer and by 3P is the same except for windows available and the jobs to be scheduled. For simplicity, when we present our results on the optimal booking and sequencing decisions, we limit our presentation to the problem faced by 3P where a collection of windows from {1, 2, . . . , K} and a sequence σ to process the jobs in N = ∪ m∈M N m are sought so that the total booking and overtime cost plus the overall tardiness penalty is minimized.
We denote this as 3P model with overtime production or (OP).
Without loss of generality, we can pre-process the parameters a t , b t : 1 ≤ t ≤ K and d j : j ∈ N so as to obtain an equivalent problem where all manufacturing windows available are consecutive, i.e.,
is the amount of overtime booked in window W t . Indeed, consider the transformation
where t j is the window at the end of which job j is due. Then, all manufacturing windows available are consecutive. In the rest of this article we will assume that the parameters a t , b t for t = 1, 2, . . . , K and d j for j ∈ N already satisfy (1).
Although the model we describe above assumes only two kinds of booking costs: h and h P , we can relax this assumption by allowing arbitrary booking rates. This will be studied in Section 3.3.
Lastly, we note that our study here is applicable to other tardiness-based criteria. We will focus on the problem where each tardy job i incurs a fixed but job-dependent tardiness penalty β i . The problem to minimize the total number of tardy jobs, and the problem to minimize the total cost of tardy jobs, will be presented in Appendices 1 and 2, respectively.
Optimal Booking and Sequencing
In this section we develop several efficient algorithms to determine optimal booking and sequencing decisions to process jobs under consideration. We first present the following properties that form the basis of our algorithms. Properties 1-i through 1-iii follow from straightforward interchange arguments based on the idea that shifting work earlier whenever possible is better, and are given without proof. Note that, for a given set of booked windows, shifting work earlier may not worsen any tardiness penalties. This is true irrespective if the early capacity is regular or overtime. We refer to W c in Property 1-i as the critical window of W O . Property 1-iv follows from the fact that it is always beneficial to utilize overtime earlier rather than later in order to reduce the tardiness cost. Properties 1-i through 1-iv help us determine an optimal window collection when α P = α. Property 1-v alludes to two critical windows -one of booking cost h and the other of h P , each being the last of its kind where overtime is used. When α P is much greater than α one may be better off to book overtime on a late window of cost h than utilize available overtime in an earlier window of cost h P . The following property helps us sequence the jobs over the windows booked and can be proved by a job-interchange argument.
Property 2. Non-tardy jobs are scheduled in the order of earliest due-date (EDD) first and pre-
cede all tardy jobs; and tardy jobs can be scheduled in any order.
Optimal sequencing given the booking decisions
For any collection of windows booked, we can apply transformation (1) so that the machine time of 3P's facility becomes continuously available. Then, the problem (OP) is equivalent to 1|| β i U i , where U j = 1 when job j finishes after time d j and 0 otherwise (Here we adopt the 3-field notation α|β|γ for scheduling problems; see Pinedo 2002 ). According to Property 2, we can define the following dynamic program (DP) to optimally solve 1|| β i U i . First, assume that the jobs are indexed in EDD order. Then, define Z(j, t) as the minimum total tardiness penalty for jobs 1, 2, . . . , j, subject to the last non-tardy job being completed at time t.
Algorithm DP
Recursive relation:
Note that the first branch of Z(j, t) considers scheduling job j early when t ≤ d j , while the second branch renders job j tardy and adds amount β j to the total tardiness penalty. The algorithm finds the optimal schedule because it evaluates all feasible options for each job. The number of states of Z(j, t) is bounded by O(|N |P ), while each application of the recurrence relation requires O (1) time. Hence, the complexity of DP is O(|N |P ).
Optimal booking
The optimal collection of windows W O for the problem (OP) can be derived using Property 1 and Algorithm DP. First, consider the special case with no overtime (i.e.,Ō = 0), which we denote as the problem with regular production or (RP). Let W be an optimal window collection. It is obvious that W will contain precisely w = Hence, for given O > 0, transformation (1) uses
The optimal r * and O * can be found by enumerating all possible values of r and O so as to minimize the total booking, overtime plus tardiness costs. We propose the following algorithm for (OP).
Algorithm Opt
Input : Collection of available windows 
Clearly, there are w 2
Ō such integral profiles for O ∈ (wŌ] or O(w 2Ō
). Therefore, by applying step [3] of Opt on all possible overtime profiles we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. Algorithm Opt optimally solves the problem (OP) in O(w
Note that the time complexity of algorithm Opt is pseudo-polynomial because of the parameters P andŌ. This complexity may be reduced for the case with equal tardiness penalties for all jobs (that is, β j = β for all j ∈ N ). By further exploiting the problem structure for this special case, we have developed an algorithm which is fully polynomial. The analysis of this case, however, requires additional optimality properties and the application of an algorithm by Moore and Hodgson (Moore 1968 ) that solves the single machine problem 1|| U i . Our result for this case is stated next, and the supporting analysis is relegated to Appendix 1. We also need to solve an optimization problem for a coalition S ⊂ N of jobs. An algorithm, referred to as Coalition, is presented in Appendix 3, which will be used in Section 4 to compute an allocation of savings to jobs (and subsequently, to the manufacturers) for any given S.
Arbitrary booking rates and overtime rates
So far we have considered two possible booking costs: h and h P . With some additional effort, our methodology extends to arbitrary booking rates
The extension addresses the important problem where 3P wishes to segment the price of utilizing her facility into different levels. Moreover, it also allows us to take care of arbitrary overtime rates, under a mild assumption.
Assume that any booking must be made in multiples of a basic time slot. Then an overtime booking can be treated like other normal booking. For example, suppose 3P's normal working hours are 8:00am-12:00noon and 2:00-6:00pm, and overtime can be booked during 12:00noon-2:00pm and 6:00-8:00pm. Booking is restricted to multiples of 0.5 hour, and the unit booking rates for the AM shift, PM shift, and overtime during noon and evening are: h AM , h P M , h ON , and h OE , respectively,
Our model with arbitrary booking rates handles such a case easily.
With the assumption of basic time slot, we no longer need the notion of maximum overtime amountŌ and so we can assumeŌ = 0. We refer to this problem as (RP-A). Note that with arbitrary booking prices, Property 2 still holds and hence jobs in N still need be indexed in EDD order. Define:
• Z A (j, t, k): the minimum total booking cost for early jobs plus tardiness cost for late jobs in 1, 2, . . . , j, when the total workload of non-tardy jobs is t and the last amongst them completes in
• H k +1,k (s): the cost of the s cheapest windows amongst 
The three branches of the above recurrence relation for Z A (j, t, k) correspond to i) both jobs j − 1 and j finish non-tardy in W k , ii) job j − 1 finishes non-tardy in W k , and job j finishes non-tardy in W k , for k < k, and iii) job j is scheduled late. The second branch accounts for a large job j that do not fit in W k and may require more than one additional windows. jobs. Irrespective of the windows booked to process these jobs, they will be tardy. Hence, for these jobs we simply require the cheapest available windows after W k . The total workload of tardy jobs is P − t and any unused time in W k after time t may be used to process tardy jobs at no additional charge. Hence, the number of additional windows needed is
Then, the total cost associated with state
) and the optimal value for (RP-A) is:
The recurrence relation for Opt-A takes O(K) time and the number of states is O(|N |P K).
Enumerating all H k ,k (·) and g k (·) takes no more than O(K log K) time per (k , k) pair, required to sort the booking rates. In most cases, it is expected that K ≤ |N | and hence O(K The above results make use of the modeling assumption that bookings are made in multiples of a basic time slot. Without this assumption we can also develop a solution algorithm that can handle continuous overtime. The algorithm is however much more complicated and involved.
Sharing the Savings
The algorithms developed above can be used by every manufacturer m ∈ M to determine his window collection W m and his job schedule over these windows, as well as by 3P to obtain the optimal window collection and processing schedule of all manufacturers. A solution for any coalition S ⊆ M of manufacturers consists of the booking decisions and the processing decisions on the jobs belonging to this coalition. The cost difference between the solution initially formed and that generated by rescheduling the jobs over their windows is the potential savings via cooperation.
We can now introduce the savings game amongst the manufacturers. Let S be an arbitrary These three (in)equalities completely describe the coordination game and are referred to as core (in)equalities, which ensure that all manufacturers have the incentives to participate in the grand coalition M that can generate the largest cost savings via coordination. A game is said to be convex
If a game is convex, it is guaranteed to have an allocation that satisfies the core inequalities (Shapley, 1971) . Unfortunately, as shown in the counterexample described in Appendix 4, game (M, v) is not convex. This therefore leaves open the question of whether an allocation y m : m ∈ M exists that satisfies the core (in)equalities. An empty core would render coordination hard to achieve because then some manufacturers would be better off to join smaller coalitions. Fortunately, this is not the case in our problem. We will show that (M, v) possesses a core allocation even though it is not convex. To do this, we first introduce and study a game based on jobs -not manufacturers.
The manufacturer game and the job game
We now introduce a cooperative game amongst manufacturers in M as well as an auxiliary game for jobs in N . The definitions for both games are developed next. Let T ⊂ M be an arbitrary coalition of manufacturers and N (T ) = ∪ i∈T N i be the set of jobs of T . Recall that σ 0 is the uncoordinated sequence of jobs formed by the manufacturers' initial bookings. Then, the coalition T seeks a sequence σ that reschedules jobs in N (T ) so as to minimize the total cost. Apart from the obvious assumptions that every manufacturer (or job) may be a member in at most one coalition and that the jobs in N (T ) may be rescheduled only in the windows belonging to T , our cooperative games allow only rescheduling sequences that do not violate the processing priority of jobs outside the coalition, i.e., the following admissibility rule should be obeyed.
Admissibility Rule: For every T ⊂ M , a rescheduling sequence σ for jobs in N (T ) is admissible only if P j (σ) = P j (σ 0 ) for all j ∈ N (T ), where P j (λ) is the set of predecessors of job j in a sequence
This admissibility rule specifies that for any job j not belonging to the coalition T , its predecessors P j (σ 0 ) should not be changed due to any rescheduling σ of the jobs of T , that is, P j (σ) = P j (σ 0 ).
Basically, this implies that "queue-jumping" without prior agreement is disallowed. This rule is meritorious in three important ways as follows:
(i) It respects the priority order of players not in T ,
(ii) It avoids "fairness" issues for 3P, and (iii) It avoids the scenario that cooperation is unable to be achieved.
With respect to (i), imagine a group of customers colluding to violate priority on a waiting line, bypassing customers not in the coalition. In a service setting this is certain to lead to chaos and does not seem to ever happen in practice. Such behavior does not seem as extreme in a manufacturing setting when customers do not usually see the waiting line. In our model, however, the FCFB protocol in 3P's booking system implies a priority order of using 3P's facility. Dissatisfied customers may resort to, in extreme cases, discrimination lawsuits if they realize that their priority in the system is violated without prior agreement, as alluded in (ii). We now proceed with the admissibility rule. We will first consider a cooperative game amongst jobs. More formally, the manufacturer game is defined as (M, v) , where v is the cost savings obtained by rescheduling the jobs in N (T ). In contrast, the job game assumes that each individual job is a player. Let v J (S) be the maximum cost savings produced by an admissible rescheduling sequence σ for coalition N (S) of jobs compared to the corresponding cost in the initial sequence σ 0 . The job game is denoted as (N, v J ) and will be studied ahead of (M, v). windows (respectively) utilized to process the jobs in G{a, b} on σ 0 . Clearly, one or both of these windows may also be occupied by jobs outside G{a, b}. In this case, coalition G{a, b} cannot release windows W e , W l (because jobs outside G{a, b} are affected) and hence no booking savings can be realized from these windows. Algorithms in Section 3 and Appendix 3 can be adapted to produce a mincost schedule for G{a, b} with which we can compute the cost savings v J {a, b}.
The savings allocation scheme
We propose the following savings allocation scheme for game (N, v J ):
where v J {1, 0} = 0 and v J {|N + 1|, N } = 0. Evidently, this allocation rule gives job i a share of 
where N m is the set of jobs owned by manufacturer m.
The balancedness
We now show that {x i } satisfy the core (in)equalities, i.e., game (N, v J ) is balanced. First, we show that the game is superadditive (Shapley, 1971) 
The superadditive property basically means that a larger coalition can do better in terms of cost savings.
For any coalition G, let σ * (G) denote the optimal job sequence obtained after rescheduling the jobs in G to minimize their total cost. 
It is evident that, in general, for any arbitrary coalitions G and H with G ∩ H = ∅, if G ∪ H contains a larger contiguous job-set than in job subsets
. This completes the proof.
We can now prove the following theorems. 
Theorem 4. Distribution {x i } i∈N is in the core of the game (N, v J ).
x i = 1 2 i∈G{a,b} v J {1, i} − v J {1, i − 1} + v J {i, |N |} − v J {i + 1, |N |} = 1 2 v J {1, b} − v J {1, a − 1} + v J {a, |N |} − v J {b + 1, |N |} .
It follows from Lemma 1 that v
Now consider the case where G{a, b} comprises more than one contiguous job set
and hence the above
Finally, if G{a, b} = N , then a = 1, b = |N |, and
Therefore, {x i } i∈N satisfy the core (in)equalities.
Theorem 5. Distribution {y m } m∈M is in the core of the game (M, v).
Proof: The non-negativity of y m follows from the non-negativity of x i . Consider an arbitrary coalition T of manufacturers. The jobs belonging to the coalition T of manufacturers forms
where the last equality is due to the fact that the total savings of coalition T must be generated from the maximum savings of its k T contiguous subsets using admissible schedules. Similarly, 
Truth-Telling Mechanism
The savings {x i } prescribed in (3) are calculated using the job parameters reported by the manufacturers. It is conceivable that a self-interested manufacturer may strategically falsify information about his jobs so as to gain a larger benefit. In this section we deal with this problem. We will design a truth-telling mechanism to incentivize all manufacturers to report their true data.
Here we assume that 3P does not withhold any portion of the booking savings (i.e., ρ = 0). We will show later that 3P may still gain a portion of the overall savings after giving the incentives to the individual players. We assume that the processing time of any job is public information. This is a realistic assumption as a job will eventually be processed by 3P and thus falsifying the processing time is impossible. The private information of a job i is its due date d i and the tardy penalty β i ;
These are parameters typically included in the contract of a manufacturer with his client. We also introduce the following notation: In the preceding definitions, the cost of a job includes the booking fee and the tardiness penalty.
If a window with a booking rate h is used to process a subset of jobs, then we assume that the portion of the booking cost of each job is proportional to the amount of its processing in that window. That is, if the total processing time for the jobs occupying the window is P s and the processing time of job i occupying the window is p i , then its share of the booking cost is
The message reported by a manufacturer is his strategy. In what follows we design a mechanism such that revealing true messages is a dominant strategy for all manufacturers to minimize their true cost. Our mechanism proposes that 3P allocate 
from 3P. Therefore, the utility (defined as the negative cost) of job i to a manufacturer is
Plugging δ i from (5) into (6), and recalling that 
for any λ. Since the processing times of all jobs do not depend on the reported messages, the solution λ also generates a feasible processing schedule under (m t i , m −i ). Thus, the inequality above also holds when λ = λ . This gives us It is now easy for us to explain why we need the assumption ρ = 0 in this Section. It can be seen from (8) that, if we have ρ > 0, then the second term of (8) will contain this parameter and so the first two terms of (8) will not be the total cost to be minimized in 3P's optimization. Note also that Proof: Due to Theorem 6, the true message m t i should be reported for job i and hence
. Then, from (7), we can see that
since the cost saving that can be achieved by a larger coalition is not less than that of a smaller one.
Another important issue in mechanism design is budget balance, i.e., the sum of payments to or charges from the players to implement the mechanism. It is known (Green and Laffont 1977) that full-budget balance (i.e., zero-sum) in direct revelation mechanisms is difficult to satisfy.
Our problem provides a natural setting where full-budget balance is not required. In our context, coordination is budget feasible for 3P if the total monetary allocation to the manufacturers does not exceed the total savings due to coordination. In this case, 3P does not need to use her own money to implement coordination; rather, she can retain any surplus as a reward for implementing it. Note that the total cost saving after the rescheduling is
, and the allocation that 3P pays out is
The last inequality holds since j =iẐ j (m −i ) is the minimum cost of scheduling the jobs {j : j = i}.
This gives us the following result.
Proposition 2. The mechanism is budget feasible for 3P to perform the coordination.
The mechanism with incentives {δ i } i∈N is designed to ensure truth revelation of the manufacturers. With this purpose achieved, 3P may allow the manufacturers to freely form any coalition, as in the cooperative game of Section 4. We will now show that, with the same constant δ * i charged to job i irrespective of which coalition it joins, where
then a modified distribution scheme based on (3) is in the core of the cooperative game.
in the core of the game (M,ṽ), withṽ =ṽ J .
A proof similar to the one in Theorem 4 yields that {x i } i∈N is in the core of (N,ṽ J ) and {ỹ m } m∈M is in the core of the game (M,ṽ J ).
To summarize, we have devised a mechanism, which ensures that all players reveal true information and hence the true optimum for the overall system is obtained. The modified allocation scheme {x i } i∈N can still motivate the players to cooperate in the grand coalition, therefore allowing the largest cost saving to be obtained.
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The Value of Coordination
In this section we perform an experiment that helps us assess the value of coordination to the various parties involved. In our experiment we generate problem instances by varying the values of parameters L, O, K, p j , d j and β j for j ∈ N , M and N i for i ∈ M , h, h P and α. In what follows we explain the levels given to each parameter in an effort to limit the number of combinations without losing essential aspects of the problem.
First, we want to let L simulate a usual production day of 8 hours for a single shift or 16
hours for double shift. In the former case we want to allow for up to O = 4 hours of overtime.
This produces three (L, O) combinations; namely (8, 0), (16, 0) and (8, 4) . The first 2 combinations only differ in the number of jobs that can be processed in a day. Rather than using an hour as the time unit, we count time in multiples of 30 minute intervals and let job processing times be multiples. Specifically, we use L = 16, 32 and O = 8. The gap between windows is assumed to be 0 and due-dates are selected appropriately later on. We consider two booking prices: h and h P = 1.3h.
Price h corresponds to booking costs during regular customer demand while h P is used for peak demand periods. Then, we randomly draw 15% or 30% of the windows and designate them as peak windows, i.e., |W P |/K ∈ {0.15, 0.30}. Processing times p j are drawn uniformly from [1, 4] for small jobs and from [5, 8] for large jobs. Therefore, the meanp j is 75 minutes for a small job and 195 minutes for a large job which are common job durations in practice. However, we add the range [20, 35] to experiment with very large jobs that, in most cases, occupy more than a full production window. This will allow us to assess the impact of such jobs on the savings due to coordination. We consider a production planning horizon of K=100 days for small and large jobs, and K=200 days for very long jobs so as to ensure that the total processing capacity exceeds the total workload. We assume that 20% of the days during the planning horizon are unavailable due to earlier reservations, non-working days, etc.
We experiment with the pairs (4, 20) and (8, 10) Consequently, the total number of combinations tested is 108.
Job due-dates are given so that at least 40% of the workload of each manufacturer is completed late. This is done by letting window
jobs in N i according to shortest processing time (SPT), and assigning
The first term of d j accounts for windows booked by manufacturers who booked prior to manufacturer i and the second term ensures that about 40% of i's workload is processed after the due-date. For each combination we randomly generate 10 problems and report in Table 1 
100%; percentage savings due to overtime availability. Table 1 Computational experiment 
As the number |M | of manufacturers increases, the booking savings increase as well. This is primarily due to consolidation of work into fewer windows with better utilization of idle time.
For fixed L + O and |M | × |N i |, asp j increases, the number of windows needed to process the total workload increases and so does the total booking cost. On the other hand, the potential benefits due to better utilization of idle time across manufacturers stay the same and hence the percentage booking savings diminish. This is evident with all processing time ranges reported in Table 1 as we move from [1, 4] to [5, 8] to [20, 35] . The same rationale explains the fact that our findings about ∆B, ∆B O do not depend on
. Namely, greater frequency of peak windows does not affect the number of windows that may be released due to better utilization of idle time across manufacturers. For |M |=4,8 the overall average booking savings are 4.53% and 10.86% respectively.
On the other hand, for p j ∈ [1, 4] , [5, 8] , [20, 35] , the average ∆B values are 14.58%, 7.44% and 1.54% respectively.
• The total savings ∆C due to coordination, increase with |M |, decrease withp j , and do not depend on
We saw earlier that booking savings ∆B, ∆B O increase with |M |. Tardiness savings increase as well because of more rearrangement opportunities across players. This is especially true for small jobs because more of them fit into the same window making them non-tardy after coordination. This is why throughout Table 1 , ∆C decreases with the ranges [1, 4] , [5, 8] , [20, 35] .
If one compares the percentage tardiness ∆C − ∆B versus the booking savings ∆B, he observes that booking savings dominate their tardiness counterpart for large and very large jobs but not for small jobs. This is because, as we argued above, the number of rearrangements that result to reduced tardiness costs decreases withp j while the booking savings stay about the same across each row of The relative contribution of tardiness savings into ∆C also depends on the size ofβ compared to ∆h. The greater the value ofβ, the greater the contribution of tardiness savings into ∆C. Note that forβ = 0.36h or 0.54h, high tardiness penalties dictate that players book the earliest available windows upon their arrival to the system (because h +β >> h P ), booking savings are limited to consolidation of the idle time available in the last windows booked by each player, window rebooking is not possible, and hence coordination savings are primarily due to job rearrangements that lead to tardiness savings. These savings are captured by the difference ∆C − ∆B and, as expected, they are directly proportional toβ. Indeed, observe that 0.54h 0.36h = 1.5 while for every combination of parameters tested, the corresponding ratio of the ∆C − ∆B values is also 1.5. In other words, when tardiness penalties are dominant, coordination benefits by capacity consolidation and the resulting refunds, plus tardiness savings that increase proportionately withβ.
• For fixed |M |, the relative contribution Table 1 , this is evident as we move from L + O = 16 to 24, to 32.
• On average, after coordination 69.5% of the manufacturers incur lower tardiness penalties.
As indicated by A + , under all scenarios approximately two-thirds of the manufacturers improve over their initial schedules in terms of the tardiness penalties. These manufacturers are primarily late comers in the FCFB order because after coordination they use windows booked by early comers that were not available when they arrived to the system. Generally, the manufacturers who initially booked the later windows benefit from coordination as they gain access to earlier windows.
Further, Table 1 indicates that the value ∆Z of overtime is significant and increases withβ. This is expected because the higher theβ the greater the incentive to book early windows at higher booking rates. Finally, the ∆O values in Table 1 suggest that the overtime usage after coordination is significantly smaller than before coordination -an additional incentive for coordination. Excluding jobs in the [20, 35] range (which is not common in practice and is presented here mostly for comparison purposes), overall coordination savings average 20.45%.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a model to coordinate the outsourced operations at a single 3P. Our mathematical and numerical analyses offer strong monetary and customer service incentives to effect coordination as well as saving sharing schemes that facilitate such coordination.
We also address the honesty issue in cooperation. We design a direct revelation mechanism to ensure that revealing truthful information is a dominant strategy for each manufacturer. A truth-telling mechanism is important to prevent the coordination from being jeopardized by selfinterested players.
There are plenty of opportunities for further investigation. A wealth of related models is of interest. They may involve different resources (as opposed to a single third party), different cost structures (e.g, both earliness and tardiness are to be minimized via outsourcing), different capacity booking protocols (e.g. bidding via competition or cooperation), further studies on revelation of private date to facilitate the success of coordination. Such models will involve many interesting and challenging topics for future research.
. This completes the left hand side of the lemma. The proof for the right hand side is analogous to our argument above except that MH is applied to windows of σ R . The amount x of overtime needed to process jobs in E R + E + {J i k } − {J i k+1 } is no more than the amount x needed to process jobs in E R + E because p i k ≤ p i k+1 . Also, none of the jobs in
} is tardy because this is the case when x units of overtime are used in σ F (because J i k / ∈ T F ). Therefore, there is an optimal schedule where J i k ∈ E * and J i k+1 may or may not be tardy. This completes the proof of the lemma.
We can now present an optimal algorithm for (OP) with constant penalties for the jobs. The algorithm examines all possible schedules W f,F that satisfy properties i, ii, iv, and v where F denotes the number of peak windows and f the total number of windows booked. Number f
. These 2 numbers together with properties i and ii completely specify the 
Appendix 2. Minimizing the Total Weighted Tardiness
In this appendix we explore the relationship of our model to the case where the lateness penalty
, where C j is the completion time of job j, for every j ∈ N . This is commonly referred to as the problem of minimizing the total weighted tardiness (TWT).
For arbitrary due dates, minimizing the TWT on a single processor is known to be strongly N Phard (Lawler, 1977) . McNaughton (1959) has also shown that allowing preemption of jobs does not affect the optimum tardiness cost.
Because of the strong N P -hardness of TWT, it is unlikely to get a polynomial-time algorithm to compute its exact solution. There is a research result, however, which shows that a pseudopolynomial algorithm exists for the TWT problem as long as the number of distint due dates is finite; see Kolliopoulos and Steiner (2006) . It is interesting to note that our model falls naturally into this pseudo-polynomially solvable setting, because of the structure of our model that the due date of every job coincides with the end of a manufacturing window, whereas the number of windows is finite. Consequently, following from Kolliopoulos and Steiner (2006), we have If one does not seek to find the exact optimal solution, the dynamic programming scheme we propose in Section 3 can be applied to yield an approximate solution for the problem (B-TWT), based on a property established in Kolliopoulos and Steiner (2006) regarding a relationship between the TWT problem and the problem of minimizing total weighted late work. First, consider the case without overtime. Let σ * , σ * T be optimal solutions for the problems (RP) and (B-TWT), respectively, and let Z(.) be the total cost. Following Kolliopoulos and Steiner (2006) we have
